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Abstract 
 
SEMANTIC CONSISTENCY IN BOUNDARY EXTENSION 
 
 
Daniel Charles LaCombe Jr.  
B.A., University of Delaware 
M.A., Appalachian State University 
 
 
Chairperson:  Christopher A. Dickinson 
 
 
 Two experiments explored the effect of semantic consistency on boundary extension 
by presenting participants with images depicting scenes with either a semantically consistent 
or inconsistent object-background relation. These were presented for either a brief or long 
duration. Based on the existing empirical evidence and a leading theory of scene perception 
that predicts boundary extension, I hypothesized that there would be more boundary 
extension for semantically inconsistent scenes compared to semantically consistent scenes for 
brief durations only. The results of two experiments did not support this hypothesis. I 
observed no difference in boundary extension for brief image durations in Experiment 1 and 
a significant difference in boundary extension for long image durations in Experiment 2, with 
semantically inconsistent scenes eliciting less boundary extension than semantically 
consistent scenes. These findings are interpreted as evidence for boundary extension being 
context-independent early in scene perception and context-dependent late in scene 
perception. I suggest that spatial computation initially operates on object-background spatial 
relations alone and does not include semantic information, whereas spatial computation later 
 v 
operates on both object-background spatial relations as well as semantic information about 
the scene. For semantically inconsistent scenes, the competing semantic information from the 
context depicted in the background and the context implied by the object interfere with 
further spatial computation later in scene perception. This explains why there is less 
boundary extension for semantically inconsistent scenes compared to semantically consistent 
scenes for long image-durations only.  Implications for models of scene perception are also 
discussed.  
Keywords: boundary extension, semantic consistency, attention, memory  
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Introduction  
Despite the highly variable nature of visual information that we encounter, humans 
are able to perceive the visual world as a discrete set of representations. In the case of natural 
scenes, we perceive and identify these visual stimuli effortlessly and in a seemingly 
automatic manner, regardless of their apparent complexity and ambiguity (Friedman, 1979; 
Potter, 1976; Schyns & Oliva, 1994). As an example, imagine a blindfolded individual 
placed in a given kitchen. Previous research suggests that in less than a second after the 
removal of the blindfold, the individual will know that they are in a kitchen (see Greene & 
Oliva, 2009; basic-level categorization, Oliva & Torralba, 2001; Potter, 1975, 1976). This 
rapid identification is accompanied by a wealth of meaningful information that can guide 
behavior, such as what one might expect to find in this area and where (Biederman, 
Mezzanotte, & Rabinowitz, 1982; Palmer, 1975; Silva, Groeger, & Bradshaw, 2006). 
Keeping with the current example, the individual now divested of the blindfold and having 
identified the surrounding space as a kitchen, would likely have a strong expectation for a 
stove located on the floor and against a wall, probably beneath a hood fan or cabinets, and 
adjacent to counter-tops (Biederman et al., 1982; Friedman, 1979). This knowledge could 
rapidly direct the eyes to this location and allow behaviors for which a stove affords, such as 
boiling a pot of water (see Henderson & Hollingworth, 1999; Rayner, 2009). Previous 
research also suggests that this may be accomplished in practically any given kitchen, 
regardless of idiosyncratic differences, such as slight differences in color, size, and layout of 
component objects (Friedman, 1979). How does the human visual system accomplish this 
task of scene perception so rapidly in light of such apparent complexity and variability? How 
do we use this rapid acquisition of scene identity to facilitate identification of its 
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constituents? Before these questions can be addressed, we must first consider what scenes are 
and the relationships that define them.  
Henderson and Hollingworth (1999) have stated that “the concept of a scene is 
typically defined. . .as a semantically coherent. . .view of a real-world environment 
comprising background elements and multiple discrete objects arranged in a spatially 
licensed manner” (p. 244). Returning to the kitchen example, a scene of this particular type 
would likely include background elements such as vinyl flooring, counter-tops and cabinets, 
and may contain objects that are semantically consistent with a kitchen, such as a 
refrigerator, a stove, and a sink. These kitchen elements also occur in a spatially licensed 
manner, with vinyl flooring being on the floor, not on the ceiling. These constituents of a 
kitchen scene and their relationships are presumably derived from prior experiences with 
kitchens, which yield an internal model of what a kitchen means, as well as the elements that 
are associated with that construct and their relations. The definition given by Henderson and 
Hollingworth (1999) implies that scene identification involves the identification of the 
separate elements of the scene and their relations, both spatial and semantic. Given that scene 
identification could involve the identification of both objects and background elements, 
might they influence the perception of one another?  
This question has been addressed extensively within the scene perception literature. 
The central idea surrounding this empirical enterprise has been that of scene semantics, that 
is, the semantic relationship between a scene’s background and its constituent objects. Early 
research in scene semantics has described and examined the contributions of multiple object-
background relations and relational violations in scene perception, including support, 
interposition, probability, position, and size (e.g., Biederman et al., 1982). The findings of 
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this early research suggested that each of these violations had a detrimental impact on scene 
perception (i.e., impaired people’s ability to identify objects in scenes), with combinations 
having a more severe influence than those occurring in isolation. The subsequent literature in 
this area of research has primarily addressed violations of probability and location, to which I 
refer as semantic and spatial, respectively. Of these two, this thesis will be almost exclusively 
concerned with semantic object-background relations, that is, the probability that an object 
will co-occur with a background. Once again returning to the kitchen example, a stove can be 
considered to be semantically consistent with a kitchen background, whereas a bed would be 
considered as semantically inconsistent with a kitchen background. It is important to note 
that semantic consistency/inconsistency is used interchangeably in the reviewed literature 
with uninformative/informative, congruent/incongruent, and episodic consistency/episodic 
inconsistency.  
As previously mentioned, scene perception is astonishingly rapid, requiring an image 
presentation of only about 100 ms for people to identify a scene’s basic-level category (e.g., 
kitchen; Potter, 1975, 1976; Schyns & Oliva, 1994). How can such rapid scene identification 
be explained? The most prominent theoretic proposition to explain this phenomenon, of 
which has received due empirical attention, is the concept of a perceptual schema 
(Biederman, 1981; Friedman, 1979). The concept of a perceptual schema is an old one, 
dating back even as far as early philosophy. A bit closer to home, the idea of a perceptual 
schema, or an internal model, has been widely recognized as a necessity in the field of 
artificial intelligence to disambiguate deprived visual input (e.g., incomplete objects; see 
Friedman, 1979). The same seems to apply for humans (as frame theorists have posited; 
Biederman, 1981; Friedman, 1979); over the course of cognitive development, humans 
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develop schemas that facilitate perception in an automatic manner (Friedman, 1979). This 
theory, which will be referred to as the perceptual schema model, posits that global relations 
between backgrounds and objects are extracted rapidly due to expectations derived from 
previous experiences and that their probabilistic co-occurrence facilitates perception when 
they are presented simultaneously. Objects and backgrounds that have not co-occurred often, 
or at all, in the subject’s experience require more perceptual effort to extract local visual 
detail in order to accomplish identification. In short, the visual system has developed an 
internal model of the external world, upon which visual information is mapped. 
The earliest sources of evidence for this type of model resulted from a series of 
experiments (Biederman 1972; Biederman, Glass, & Stacy, 1973; Biederman, Rabinowitz, 
Glass, & Stacy, 1974) in which global relations of a scene were manipulated. This was 
accomplished by jumbling pictures, which specifically means segregating an image into a 
given number of squares (in this case six) and reassembling them without rotating them. The 
participant’s task was to identify a target object at a cued location from four alternative 
objects that all appeared within the scene. The square containing the target object was never 
moved so that the normal spatial position of the object was held constant while the 
surrounding context was manipulated. If global context surrounding the object facilitates 
object identification, then one would predict better performance in the non-jumbled 
condition. Indeed, these studies found an object identification advantage for targets in the 
non-jumbled condition over targets contained in jumbled pictures. This was taken as 
evidence for the rapid acquisition of a perceptual schema via global relations that facilitated 
object recognition; those global relations were deteriorated in jumbled pictures, hence poorer 
object recognition. These seminal studies should be taken with a grain of salt, however, as 
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criticisms of this early paradigm may constrain the validity of their findings (such as 
introducing new contours by dividing the image – possibly the source of perceptual 
difficulty; see Henderson & Hollingworth, 1999), some of which are discussed later.  
Since these initial sources of evidence, there have been many empirical studies aimed 
at testing the predictions of the perceptual schema model as it relates to scene semantics. In 
behavioral studies, measures of object detection in experiments in which the semantic 
consistency between objects and backgrounds are manipulated have been used as evidence of 
a perceptual schema. In these paradigms, a scene is presented briefly and then masked (i.e., 
interrupted by a homogeneous array so that visual information cannot be held in sensory 
memory). Next, the participant is prompted to determine whether a given target appeared at a 
cued location within the scene. Measurement of detection in these studies is operationalized 
as a sensitivity measure, d’. The logic behind the object-detection approach is that if a 
perceptual schema is activated rapidly, then objects consistent with a particular schema will 
be more readily identified. This is the primary paradigm used in the scene semantics 
literature; earlier studies have used priming and change detection paradigms and will be 
described shortly. In eye movement paradigms, which are not mutually exclusive with 
object-detection approaches, eye trackers record where people are looking while exploring a 
scene. Information is extracted almost exclusively during fixations because visual 
information is suppressed during saccades (see Irwin & Brockmole, 2004; Matin, 1974). 
Thus, the duration of a fixation is taken to be a measure of the amount of processing required 
for an object at that given fixation; longer fixations reflect more perceptual processing and 
extraction of local visual information. These two behavioral measures represent the majority 
of support for perceptual schema models of scene perception; therefore, they will be the two 
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primary measures reviewed here. In addition to these sources of evidence, modifications of 
the object identification paradigm, event-related potential measurements, and computational 
modeling will be reviewed briefly.  
Following the first sources of evidence for contextual facilitation from jumbled-scene 
paradigms (Biederman 1972; Biederman et al., 1973, 1974), Palmer (1975) asked whether 
scenes would contextually prime certain objects that did not appear in the scene. To do this, 
he developed a priming paradigm in which a line drawing of a scene (e.g., a counter-top with 
a cutting board) was presented for 2 s followed by a target object (e.g., loaf of bread) 
presented for durations of 20, 40, 60, or 120 ms. After the object presentation, the subject 
was then instructed to write down the name of the object. The results of the study showed a 
clear advantage for identifying objects that were consistent with the context conveyed by the 
preceding image, for all durations. These results suggest that the prime image activated a 
perceptual schema which contained candidate objects that have occurred in that context in 
previous experiences. 
Friedman (1979) asked whether a perceptual schema might make the perception of 
objects in prototypical scenes an automatic and top-down process compared to scenes that 
had unlikely objects presented within them, which may be characterized by more controlled 
extraction of perceptual information. The experimental paradigm – essentially a change 
detection paradigm – involved a presentation of two pictures separated by a mask in which a 
single object changed. The change was a token change (e.g., a lamp exchanged for another 
lamp, with only subordinate differences), a location change, a deletion, or a type change (of 
differing semantic consistency; e.g., high to low – farm scene exchanging cow for 
hippopotamus). Subjects were asked to indicate if a change was detected between the two 
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pictures.  She found that subjects noticed more changes from semantically consistent to 
inconsistent objects, whereas substituting a consistent object with another consistent object 
was not detected as accurately. The eye movement data from this study were complementary 
to the object change detection task in that consistent objects were fixated for shorter 
durations than inconsistent objects (similar results to Loftus & Mackworth, 1978). 
Collectively, these results suggest that objects consistent with a scene were processed more 
automatically, requiring less encoding of perceptual information for identification and 
therefore resulting in poorer discrimination in the change detection task (Friedman, 1979); 
therefore, an implication for the perceptual schema theory may be that objects inconsistent 
with a background will recruit more attention to extract local visual detail. This point will be 
discussed more in the next section.  
The study by Friedman (1979) addressed exclusively the question of probabilistic 
relations between scene context and the objects occurring within them. Biederman et al. 
(1982) extended this work by asking whether both probabilistic relations and other semantic 
and syntactical relations, such as size, support, interposition, and position affected the 
perception of objects within a scene. In this experiment, the name of the target object was 
presented until the participant self-initiated a given trial. Once initiated, a scene would appear 
for 150 ms followed by a spatial cue at which time the object to be detected would appear. 
Following this, two object alternatives were provided – the object that was present, and 
another object that was not present. The target object in a given trial could either be 
consistent with the context, or inconsistent, violating semantic (e.g., probability of co-
occurrence) or syntactic (e.g., physical support) relations, or compound violations (e.g., an 
object that is both improbable and not physically supported). Object detection was 
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operationalized as a sensitivity measure, d’. Biederman et al. (1982) hypothesized that if a 
scene schema is rapidly activated, then objects that are consistent with the expectations 
generated by that schema should be detected more accurately, as indicated by the sensitivity 
measure, d’. The results of the study supported this hypothesis, with objects violating 
semantic relations having lower sensitivity measures, and with compound violations having 
even a larger decrement.  
Despite these sources of support for the perceptual schema model of scene 
perception, there also exists evidence contrary to this model. De Graef, Christiaens, and 
d’Ydewalle (1990) noted an alternative interpretation of the results generated by the object 
detection paradigm used by Biederman et al. (1982). Whereas the object detection advantage 
was interpreted by Biederman et al. (1982) as increased perceptibility of objects that were 
consistent with a perceptual schema, de Graef et al. (1990) suggested that this advantage 
could also be explained by post-perceptual guessing that placed an overreliance on contextual 
information. That is, instead of more accurately perceiving an object that is consistent with a 
particular perceptual schema, the contextual information extracted from the 150 ms stimulus 
duration (e.g., Schyns & Oliva, 1994) would be available after stimulus offset, allowing 
participants to make educated guesses as to whether the object was present or not, even if the 
object had not been perceived. To address these alternatives, de Graef et al. (1990) developed 
a paradigm in which the task minimized the explicit use of contextual information by 
instructing participants to engage in an object-decision task (indicating if closed entities were 
known objects) and by using first-fixations of objects as a more unobtrusive measure of 
object identification (unreflective of post-perceptual processes). Line drawings of real-world 
setting were presented that either adhered to or violated some of the five semantic violations 
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described by Biederman et al. (1982) and that contained different amounts of non-object 
targets (zero to three). Once fixation was made to a central fixation cross, a given scene was 
presented for 8 s, after which participants were instructed to press a key once for every non-
object present in the scene (data of which was not actually recorded). Main effects of longer 
first-fixations on display items were found for semantic violations, consistent with earlier 
studies (Friedman, 1979; Loftus & Mackworth, 1978); however, the authors performed 
further analyses by using the median fixation count (eight fixations) as a cutoff for first-
fixation durations to create early (first eight fixations) and late (n fixations after eighth 
fixation) fixation-moment groups. This analysis revealed a main effect of longer-fixation 
durations in the late fixation-moment group, indicating that differences in first-fixation 
durations between semantically consistent and inconsistent objects only emerged late in 
scene viewing, which is inconsistent with a rapidly activated perceptual schema (Biederman 
et al., 1982).  
Hollingworth and Henderson (1998; 1999) also addressed some of the 
methodological issues present in the Biederman et al. (1982) research paradigm, which has 
been considered as the most convincing source of evidence for the perceptual schema model 
(as noted by Henderson & Hollingworth, 1999). They noted that the sensitivity measure used 
by Biederman et al. (1982) calculated false alarm rates by averaging across both consistent 
and inconsistent object conditions, which may have artificially raised the sensitivity measure 
for the base (consistent) condition compared to violation (inconsistent) conditions. That is, 
false-alarm rates were higher in the base conditions; by averaging with false-alarm rates from 
the violation condition, this lowers the overall false-alarm rate value. When d’ is calculated, 
this lower overall false-alarm value artificially raises base rate values and lowers violation 
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values, which may have been the source of significant differences. They also noted that the 
target label prior to scene viewing may have been used to guide search and that the spatial 
cue may have served as evidence for the types of objects that likely occur at that location 
(Henderson, 1992; Hollingworth & Henderson, 1998). Lastly, they noted (as did Boyce & 
Pollastek, 1992; de Graef et al., 1990) that there may have been a response bias associated 
with an overreliance on contextual information.  
To address the bias in the detection sensitivity measure, Hollingworth and Henderson 
(1998) calculated detection sensitivity by calculating false-alarm rates for each condition 
separately; for both conditions, sensitivity was based only on the correct detection of a 
particular object when it was present and false detection of the same object when it was not 
present (Hollingworth & Henderson, 1998). The target preview/location cue advantages were 
addressed by placing the object label after the scene presentation, without a location cue. 
This involved modifying the Biederman et al. (1982) paradigm by having participants fixate 
a central fixation cross for 500 ms, presenting a series of Xs for 1.5 s (which was used to 
equate stimulus presentations of the original paradigm) followed by scene presentation for 
200 ms. and then presenting the object label embedded with a pattern mask until response 
(i.e., participant indicating the presence or absence of the object label by responding yes or 
no). Finally, the response bias was controlled for by using a forced go/no-go paradigm in 
which both object labels are either semantically consistent or inconsistent. Also involving a 
modification of the Biederman et al. (1982) paradigm, this was implemented in a separate 
experiment by having participants fixate at a central fixation cross for 500 ms, presenting the 
scene for 250 ms followed by a 30 ms mask, and lastly having two object labels – that were 
either both semantically consistent or inconsistent – presented beside each other until 
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response (i.e., pressing either a left or right button to indicate if they thought that object label 
on the left or right appeared in the scene, respectively). When all of these biases were 
separately controlled, the consistent object performance advantage disappeared, or even 
reversed in some cases (label post-view). This difference in findings has motivated the 
development of a functional isolation model (FIM) of object and background perception 
(Henderson, 1992; also see Henderson & Hollingworth, 1999), which the space allotted here 
does not allow for ample review, although in brief, it posits that the perception of objects and 
the backgrounds in which they are presented do not influence one another early in scene 
perception.  
Finally, Henderson, Weeks, and Hollingworth (1999) asked if the discrepant findings 
of earlier eye-tracking studies in the semantic consistency literature could be attributable to 
differences in paradigms used. In this article, they noted that a potential source of difference 
between the de Graef et al. (1990) and Loftus and Mackworth (1978) studies could be the 
nature of the task, with the former being a visual search task and the latter being a memory 
test. To ensure that the absence of an early contextual effect was not attributable to the type 
of the task, Henderson et al. (1999) used line-drawing stimuli similar to the two previous 
studies, but used a memory task akin to Loftus and Mackworth (1978), although in both 
cases, the memory test never took place. The paradigm involved a 15-s presentation of line-
drawing scenes in which either semantically consistent or inconsistent objects appeared, and 
the participant was instructed to prepare for a memory test after all scenes were presented 
(which, as mentioned previously, never took place).  Supporting the findings of de Graef et 
al. (1990), the results indicated that initial fixation placement was not controlled by the 
semantics of a scene, once again contradicting the predictions of the perceptual schema 
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model that posits rapid activation upon viewing. Instead it appeared that target objects were 
fixated when approximately 3° away from the current fixation location, suggesting that 
fixations are controlled more parafoveally (i.e., area of the retina between fovea and 
periphery) than by context, as suggested by Henderson, Pollatsek, and Rayner (1989), and 
also supported the proposed FIM (Henderson, 1992). Although this was the case, inconsistent 
objects were nonetheless fixated for longer durations on the first-pass fixation.  
The research reviewed so far has displayed a transition from initial strength of the 
perceptual schema model of scene perception to ever growing skepticism of its validity; 
however, more recent studies have provided support for the concept of an internal model. 
Specifically, Davenport and Potter (2004) asked the question of whether objects and 
backgrounds will influence the identification of one another based on their semantic, 
probabilistic relations, thus further testing the predictions of the perceptual schema model. 
The approach they used to address this question paralleled those used in previous studies, but 
differed in subtle ways. The stimuli used in their study were real, color photographs as 
opposed to line-drawings and contained a single foreground object instead of multiple 
objects. Additionally, they used an identification task (i.e., participants were asked to name 
the object, the background, or both) whereas Henderson and Hollingworth (1998, 1999) used 
a forced-choice two-alternative task which forced participants to guess if they were unsure, 
and may have given inconsistent objects an asymmetrical advantage (see Davenport & 
Potter, 2004). As in previous studies, the hypothesis tested, which is generated by the 
perceptual schema theory, was that context should be activated rapidly enough to influence 
the perception of elements within a scene. The results supported this hypothesis, finding an 
object identification advantage when objects were presented within a semantically consistent 
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background for 80 ms. These findings contradict earlier studies providing evidence against 
the existence of a rapidly activated perceptual schema but the authors noted that these 
differences are likely attributable to differences in paradigms; the stimuli and task used by 
Davenport and Potter (2004) were probably more sensitive to contextual effects elicited by 
the proposed perceptual schema, and those effects may have been overshadowed in more 
complex stimuli used by Henderson and Hollingworth (1998, 1999).  
In support of this newfound evidence for the existence of a rapidly activated 
perceptual schema, Bonitz and Gordon (2008) provided eye movement results that support 
the perceptual schema model of scene perception. As with the previous eye tracking studies 
reviewed here, this study was concerned with fixation durations as a measure of perceptual 
effort required to encode an object at fixation. The paradigm used real color photographs 
presented for 10 s during which participants were instructed to explore the scene freely and 
were subsequently asked to rate the scene for pleasantness (this was done to engage 
participants in viewing the scene when eye movements were being recorded). Results of the 
study revealed that fixation durations were longer for inconsistent objects. These findings are 
consistent with earlier eye tracking studies (Friedman, 1979; Loftus & Mackworth, 1978) but 
are inconsistent with more recent studies (de Graef et al., 1990; Henderson & Hollingworth, 
1998, 1999). The authors attributed the discrepancy in results to the nature of the stimuli; like 
the explanation given by Davenport and Potter (2004), Bonitz and Gordon (2008) suggested 
that their more simplistic stimuli may have been more sensitive to perceptual effects of 
semantic inconsistency, whereas the more complex stimuli used by de Graef et al. (1990) and 
Henderson and Hollingworth (1998, 1999) may have made it more difficult for participants 
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to identify objects thus not allowing perceptual effects to emerge in those experimental 
paradigms.  
More recently, Sun, Simon-Dack, Gordon, and Teder (2011) have also provided 
supporting evidence of the theory of a rapidly activated perceptual schema that facilitates 
object perception. Like many of the previous studies, they asked whether scene context 
would facilitate perception of the constituent objects. The paradigm they used to answer this 
question was a go/no-go task in which participants were instructed to indicate whether an 
animal appeared within a non-masked scene presented for 20 ms. To manipulate the 
influence of scene context, they either retained, deleted, or phase randomized the background 
in the stimuli surrounding a foreground object. Phase randomization involves a procedure 
where random noise can be introduced that effectively removes semantic information while 
preserving low-level image properties, such as luminance and spatial frequency; this allowed 
any differences under these conditions to be attributable to loss of semantic information and 
not differences in low-level image properties. Behavioral results indicated that accuracy was 
higher and reaction times were faster in the animal present go/no-go task with the 
background intact compared to both the deleted and phase randomized background 
conditions. The authors of this study also collected event-related potentials (ERPs) while 
participants completed the task. ERPs are graded levels of positive or negative electrical 
activity measured at the scalp that are indicative of brain processes that occur at predictable 
stages in time after the onset of an event (i.e., latency of an ERP component, which can be 
used to provide estimates of visual processing over time; Thorpe, Fize, & Marlot, 1996). 
Consistent with the reaction time results, the onset latency of the frontal component 
associated with the go/no-go task (e.g., Thorpe et al., 1996) was delayed for objects 
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occurring outside of their original context, providing converging evidence that scene context 
facilitates object perception.  
Up to this point, the way in which the literature has been reviewed has focused almost 
exclusively on a perceptual schema facilitating subsequent analysis of objects within a scene. 
But could the contextual elicitations of objects influence the perception of backgrounds? In 
addition to finding an identification advantage for objects occurring within semantically 
consistent backgrounds, Davenport and Potter (2004) and Davenport (2007) provided the 
first sources of evidence for identification advantages for backgrounds in which semantically 
consistent objects were presented. When asked to identify the background of a masked image 
presented for 80 ms, accuracy was significantly higher when a foreground object was 
consistent with the background than when it was inconsistent. This finding led to the 
proposal of an interactive model of scene perception, which posits that scenes and their 
constituent elements are processed holistically; objects and backgrounds provide contexts for 
one another in a mutually constraining manner. Although not a major departure from the 
perceptual schema model of scene perception, the interactive model does not assume that a 
schema is necessarily activated prior to object context, but rather that they occur in parallel; 
“Objects provide the context for the background, and the background provides the context for 
foreground objects” (Davenport, 2007, p. 394). Following this theoretical proposal, a couple 
of noteworthy studies have provided supporting evidence for this theory, arriving in the form 
of behavioral and computational model findings.  
Although they did not explicitly manipulate object-background semantic consistency, 
Joubert, Rousselet, Fize, and Fabre-Thorpe (2007) provided supporting evidence for the 
influence of object semantic consistency on background perception. The authors asked how 
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quickly humans can globally contextualize scenes at the superordinate level, such as whether 
they were man-made or natural, which is more general than basic-level contextual 
identification (e.g., mountain, valley; Oliva & Torralba, 2001). To do so, they asked 
participants to complete a go/no-go task in which they categorized a real color photograph of 
either a man-made environment or a natural environment presented for 26 ms. These scenes 
were accurately categorized at 96%, with reaction times around 390 ms. When analyzed 
post-hoc for object congruency (e.g., man-made object such as a building in a city would be 
congruent, while a tree in a city would be incongruent), results indicated that scene 
categorization was significantly impaired for incongruent scenes. An effect of object 
inconsistency interfering with scene categorization at such an early time interval provides 
supporting evidence for the interactive model of scene perception; rapid object recognition 
may be available early enough to influence scene identification and may not necessarily 
occur after schema activation.  
The findings of Joubert et al. (2007) discussed above were replicated by Mack and 
Palmeri (2010), who also used a go/no-go categorization task of either man-made 
environments or natural environments using color photographs but instead had an explicit 
manipulation of object-background consistency. As in Joubert et al. (2007), categorization 
performance was diminished for inconsistent trials relative to consistent trials, and reaction 
times were faster for consistent object-background conditions. Mack and Palmeri (2010) then 
furthered these findings by developing a computational model that integrated a scene 
categorization model (Oliva & Torralba, 2001) and a perceptual decision making model 
(Ratcliff, 1978) to simulate behavioral data. The scene categorization model developed by 
Oliva and Torralba (2001) extracts the global spatial structure of a scene and compares this to 
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derived spectral properties that were diagnostic of particular spatial characteristics (e.g., 
naturalness) – a feature space termed the Spatial Envelope. In the case of an inconsistent 
scene (e.g., forest scene with a shed as a foreground object), the spatial statistics will be 
slightly discrepant from those in a consistent scene (e.g., a forest scene with a bush as a 
foreground object) and therefore provide lower quality evidence towards its correct 
categorization (i.e., spatial statistics further from those diagnostic of either natural or man-
made scenes). When conjoined with the decision making model (Ratcliff, 1978), poorer 
perceptual evidence results in slower reaction times and lower accuracy in scene 
categorization. Consistent with the behavioral data, the model’s simulation revealed that 
accuracy in categorization was higher and reaction times were faster for semantically 
consistent scenes.  The findings of this study imply that slight differences in the overall 
spatial statistics of scenes (e.g., right-angles and straight horizontal/vertical lines in man-
made scenes and oblique contours and curved lines in natural scenes) could explain the 
perceptual differences between consistent and inconsistent scenes without stipulating distinct 
object and background recognition processes. 
It should be clear by now that there exists evidence that semantic consistency, 
specifically the probability that an object will co-occur with a background, has an impact on 
scene identification. Although there exists mixed evidence within the literature for the effects 
of scene semantics, these discrepancies can be explained when the differences in stimuli are 
considered; experimental paradigms that find evidence for semantic inconsistency 
detrimentally impacting scene perception use more simplistic stimuli that may be more 
sensitive to these types of perceptual effects. Having said this, the plausibility of perceptual 
schema and interactive models of scene perception remain strong despite some sources of 
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contradicting evidence, yet further research remains to be implemented for these theories to 
become more firmly supported. Nonetheless, it is safe to say that there is evidence that 
semantic consistency does appreciably affect the perception of scenes and their constituent 
elements. Scene identification, however, is only one aspect of scene perception. Could 
semantic consistency affect other aspects of scene perception? 
Semantic Consistency in Boundary Extension  
Identifying and categorizing scenes is a fundamental aspect of scene perception; it 
allows one to understand what objects and events are likely to take place within that space as 
well as the types of behaviors that type of space affords. Another aspect of scene perception 
involves the representation of the spatial expanse depicted in a view of a scene (e.g., a close-
up or a wide-angle view). The importance of such a computation is illuminated when 
considering the constraints of the visual system. Because of the physical structure of the eye 
and their socket positions in the front of the head (for humans at least) the entire visual world 
can never be completely accessed at any given point in time. Additionally, information 
received by the retina is not homogeneously represented throughout the visual system; input 
at the fovea is of highest acuity, with resolution falling as a function of distance from the 
fovea (see O’Regan, 1992); therefore, visual input in the periphery is of low resolution and 
often considered as “fuzzy.” Because we can never simultaneously view the surrounding 
space at once and that even a given view of the world is of low quality at the periphery, the 
need for the visual system to be able to understand the space depicted within a scene 
becomes clearer; that is, we often need to reference or orient to objects and events occurring 
in the spatial surround (which are not completely available in the present view). It is 
therefore advantageous to predict the nature of that area (e.g., layout, surfaces, objects, etc.). 
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Boundary extension (Intraub & Richardson, 1989), which is the phenomenon of 
remembering a more spatially expansive view than was originally shown, presumably 
reflects such a computation. The typical boundary extension paradigm involves the 
presentation of either a close-up or wide-angle view of a scene followed by a retention 
interval and then a memory test, typically a recognition task, in which the test view can either 
be identical to the stimulus or different (i.e., more close-up or more wide-angle). When 
presented with identical stimulus and test views, participants on average tend to report the 
test picture as being closer-up in comparison to the stimulus picture, with the effect being 
more pronounced for close-up views than for wide-angle views, and with the latter 
sometimes not eliciting unidirectional memory distortions (average response of “same view”) 
depending on how wide-angle the view is (e.g., Dickinson & Intraub, 2008; Intraub, Bender, 
& Mangels, 1992; Intraub, Daniels, Horowitz, & Wolfe, 2008; Intraub & Dickinson, 2008; 
Intraub & Richardson, 1989; Park, Intraub, Yi, Widders, & Chun, 2007). The predominant 
interpretation of participants tending to report test views as closer-up is that stimulus views 
are remembered as being more wide-angle than they appeared.  
This interpretation is corroborated by the asymmetry in average responses made when 
the test view is an alternative; when the stimulus is a close-up version of a picture and the test 
image is the wide-angle version, the test image is rated as more similar to the stimulus than 
when the stimulus is the wide-angle version of a picture and the test image is the close-up 
version (e.g., Intraub et al., 1992). In both cases, the same close-up and wide-angle versions 
are being compared, with the only difference being which one serves as the stimulus image 
and which serves as the test image. This asymmetry provides converging evidence for the 
interpretation stated above; close-up stimuli elicit boundary extension, making the memory 
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representation of a given image closer to the wide-angle version, whereas wide-angle stimuli 
elicit little or no boundary extension, thus preserving the difference between the views. Also 
parallel to these findings and interpretations, Park et al. (2007) found selective attenuation 
(neuronal behavior that indexes the sequential presentation of identical stimuli) in neural 
nuclei known to be involved in scene perception (i.e., the parahippocampal place area and the 
retrosplenial cortex) only when a close-up stimulus was followed by a wide-angle test view, 
and not vice-versa. Like the behavioral results above (Intraub et al., 1992), this brain area 
seems to respond to wider-angle test pictures as if they were more similar to the closer-up 
stimulus picture presented earlier.  
There is evidence that this error of commission appears early in scene perception 
(Dickinson & Intraub, 2008; Intraub & Dickinson, 2008). Intraub and Dickinson (2008) used 
the typical boundary extension paradigm described above, in which an image is presented, 
masked, and followed by a recognition test where either an identical or alternative view is 
shown. In this experiment, images were presented for 250 ms and masked at the shortest time 
interval of 42 ms, commensurate to the duration of a saccade (Rayner, 2009). Consistent with 
previous studies, a visual mask intervening between stimulus and test views – in this case as 
brief as 42 ms – was sufficient to elicit memory errors diagnostic of boundary extension (i.e., 
the behavioral asymmetry described above as well as the tendency to rate close-up test 
pictures as more close up than the close-up stimulus of the same view as the test picture). 
Intraub and Dickinson (2008) suggested that it was highly unlikely that boundary extension 
could be occurring during the interval of a 42 ms mask, and instead suggested that it may be 
a result of processes occurring during scene viewing, rather than after.  
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The claim that the processes eventually resulting in boundary extension occur, or at 
least began, during scene viewing is central to Intraub’s (2010) multi-source model of scene 
perception. The multi-source model (Intraub, 2010) posits that scene perception is essentially 
an act of spatial cognition; when we are looking at a part of the world, visual information is 
mapped onto an egocentric spatial-framework that surrounds the viewer and amodal input 
(i.e., non-perceptual; Kanizsa, 1979; Yin, Kellman, & Shipley, 2000) fills in low-resolution 
and incomplete information at the edges of the view. When viewing a scene, these multiple 
sources are simultaneously involved and are reliably distinguished given that the view is 
available. When a scene is removed or interrupted, however, sources of information are no 
longer reliably demarcated, as they are hypothesized not to have explicit “tags” associated 
with them. Under these circumstances, boundary extension effectively becomes a source-
monitoring error (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993); amodal input is erroneously 
attributed as visually derived, which predicts a bias to remember views as more wide-angle – 
consistent with boundary extension. This model provides a more parsimonious explanation of 
the findings, especially when compared to attempts at modifying existing models of visual 
memory buffers (e.g., transsaccadic memory, Irwin, 1991; visual short-term memory, 
Phillips, 1974; conceptual short-term memory, Potter, 1976) by assuming additional 
perceptual mechanisms such as an “extrapolation process” (Intraub & Dickinson, 2008). 
As mentioned previously, boundary extension appears to reflect the computation of 
mapping a discrete visual input onto a continuous spatial framework, as proposed by the 
multi-source model (Intraub, 2010). Indeed, studies have shown that boundary extension 
occurs only for scenes that depict partial views of a larger surrounding space (Gottesman & 
Intraub, 2002; Intraub, Gottesman, & Bills, 1998). Intraub et al. (1998) presented individuals 
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with a sequence of images followed by a recognition test in which the test view was either 
identical (e.g., close-up stimulus, close-up test view; wide-angle stimulus, wide-angle test-
view) or an alternative (e.g., close-up stimulus, wide-angle test view; wide-angle stimulus, 
close-up test view), with a given image having both close-up and wide-angle versions. They 
manipulated what was depicted in a scene by creating line drawings of objects from intact 
images and placing them on blank backgrounds; line drawings of objects on blank 
backgrounds depicted a “complete” view (i.e., no surrounding space beyond edges of view), 
whereas intact images with backgrounds depicted a partial view (i.e., surrounding space 
beyond edges of view). The intact pictures elicited patterns of memory errors diagnostic of 
boundary extension (i.e., boundary extension for close-up images and no bias towards 
unidirectional errors for wide-angle images), whereas pictures containing an object on a 
blank background did not (i.e., extension for close-up images and restriction for wide-angle 
images – a pattern of results characteristic of normalization, in which errors occur in 
direction of the average view size). Thus, it appeared that the visual system was not treating 
these two types of stimuli equivalently. For those stimuli containing just an object on a blank 
background, however, patterns of memory errors diagnostic of boundary extension occurred 
when participants were asked to imagine the object as being part of a more spatially 
expansive view, which the authors suggested supported the existence of a perceptual schema 
that could be activated via a scene depicting a larger space or via imagination. This basic 
pattern of results has been replicated by Gottesman and Intraub (2002) in which background 
construal was manipulated by showing a participant the object being placed on a blank 
background. Under these conditions, boundary extension was eliminated, supporting the idea 
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that boundary extension is sensitive to whether we construe a scene as depicting a larger 
space.  
Intraub et al. (1998) suggested that the reason objects on blank backgrounds did not 
elicit patterns of memory errors indicative of boundary extension was because these types of 
stimuli violated all five semantic relationships proposed by Biederman et al. (1982; i.e., 
probability, position, interposition, support, and size). That is, images violating all semantic 
and syntactical relationships that define a real-world scene will not depict a larger spatial 
surrounding and therefore should not induce memory errors diagnostic of boundary 
extension. They also noted that in boundary extension experiments using semantically 
inconsistent objects and backgrounds (e.g., stuffed animal on stairs, banana on rocks), 
boundary extension was not eliminated. How might object-background semantic consistency 
influence boundary extension? Previous research in the scene semantics literature provides 
supporting evidence for the claim that when objects are inconsistent with the surrounding 
background, more attention is required to process them fully; if this were the case, it would 
predict more boundary extension for inconsistent scenes than consistent scenes. The 
following discussion briefly reviews literature providing supporting evidence for this 
attention-based prediction.  
One source of evidence for increased attentional allocation to inconsistent objects 
compared to consistent objects is provided by the results from the change-detection paradigm 
used by Friedman (1979), in which substitutions of consistent objects with another consistent 
object were detected with lower accuracy than substitutions of consistent objects with 
inconsistent objects (or vice versa). This finding suggests that more attention was devoted to 
the perception of inconsistent objects, allowing participants to extract more local visual detail 
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that served to aid discrimination between changes across pictures when inconsistent objects 
were involved. Another source of support for the hypothesis that inconsistent objects are 
likely to receive more attention than consistent objects is provided by the results of eye 
tracking studies that report longer durations for initial fixations to inconsistent objects 
compared to consistent objects (Bonitz & Gordon, 2008; Friedman, 1979; Loftus & 
Mackworth, 1978). Together, these sources of evidence suggest that inconsistent objects 
recruit more attention compared to consistent objects. If this is the case, it may be possible 
that allocating more attentional resources to a central foreground object in a scene would 
make it more difficult to delineate between perceptual and amodal sources of information at 
the borders of a view during a memory test, resulting in larger amounts of boundary 
extension.  
Indeed, it has recently been proposed that attention may serve to delineate between 
sources of information involved in scene perception (multi-source model; Intraub, 2010), 
based on the findings of Intraub et al. (2008). In this study, images were presented for 750 ms 
with 2s and 5s superimposed upon the images and a view-recognition test was given on each 
trial for both the memory-only and divided-attention conditions. In the divided-attention 
condition, participants were instructed to prioritize the counting of the number of 5s 
superimposed on the image and to indicate their response immediately after image offset 
when the digit input display was available (5 s display), which was then followed by 
feedback on their performance (2 s display). In this condition, participants were told that the 
recognition task was of secondary importance. In the memory-only condition, participants 
were instructed to perform only the recognition task and to ignore the digit input and digit 
feedback displays. Like previous studies, stimulus images were either close-up or wide-angle 
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and test views could be either identical or the alternative view. The results of the study 
indicated that both conditions elicited memory errors diagnostic of boundary extension, but 
that divided-attention produced more pronounced levels (Intraub et al., 2008). Based on these 
findings, we hypothesize that when visual attention is allocated exclusively to encoding a 
given scene, the resulting representation is high in perceptual weight, allowing the individual 
to reject amodal information as perceptually derived with confidence, and thus reducing the 
boundary extension error. When visual attention is not entirely devoted to encoding scene 
content, however, perceptual information corresponding to a scene would be expected to be 
of lower quality, making it more likely that participants would accept amodal information as 
perceptually derived. The result of this divided attention is an increased memory error, which 
for our purposes manifests in the form of boundary extension; the lower the quality of 
perceptual information, the more likely one is to commit this error of commission. This 
proposition, that attention allows the viewer to better delineate between sources of 
information (e.g., perceptual, amodal), allows one to test the predictions of the multi-source 
model of scene perception under conditions of known attentional modulation – in this case, 
instances of semantic inconsistency.  
In contrast to the overall investment of attention in encoding a scene, it may be that 
where attention is allocated during scene perception can affect memory for a given scene. In 
a recent ERP study, Martens, Trujillo-Barreto, and Gruber (2011) asked whether attention 
may be differentially allocated across a scene across conditions of semantic consistency and 
inconsistency. They used a relatively new ERP technique called the steady-state visually 
evoked potential (SSVEP) which is an oscillatory response of the visual cortex at the same 
temporal frequency (Hz) as the inducing flickering stimulus. Importantly, higher SSVEP 
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amplitudes are associated with increased attentional allocation to the flickering stimulus (e.g., 
Morgan, Hansen, & Hillyard, 1996; Müller & Hillyard, 2000; Müller Malinowski, & 
Hillyard, 2003). By tagging objects and backgrounds with different frequencies (i.e., having 
objects and backgrounds presented at 8.6 and 12 Hz, respectively), a Fourier Transform can 
reveal differential attentional allocation to objects and backgrounds as indicated by the 
relative amplitudes of their corresponding frequencies in the SSVEP. Tagging the objects and 
backgrounds with frequencies specifically involves manipulating the luminance of these 
portions of the scene such that half of the time it is a lower level of luminance and the other 
half of the time it is a higher level of luminance; the frequency that a stimulus is tagged with 
determines how many times the luminance is oscillated (e.g., 12 Hz would correspond to 12 
oscillations of luminance per second).  
In the paradigm used by Martens et al. (2011), participants were simply asked to 
detect the presence of a dot that was randomly presented within 4° of central fixation, which 
was superimposed upon a foreground object presented at 8.6 Hz and a background presented 
at 12 Hz. Although the object and background comprising the scenes were irrelevant to the 
task, previous studies have provided evidence that attended stimuli superimposed over a 
flickering stimulus (in this case a centrally presented dot on top of a scene with a 
semantically consistent or inconsistent foreground object) results in higher SSVEP 
amplitudes compared to unattended stimuli superimposed over a flickering stimulus, when 
distance from fixation is controlled (Morgan et al., 1996; Müller & Hillyard, 2000; Müller et 
al., 2003). In both cases, the SSVEP is elicited by the background flickering stimulus, and 
not by the superimposed attended vs. unattended stimulus. The findings of the study 
(Martens et al., 2011) showed that attention was allocated more to the backgrounds during 
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consistent object-background presentations, whereas in the inconsistent conditions, attention 
was selectively allocated to the foreground object. Based on these findings, we predict that 
there will be more boundary extension for inconsistent scenes (Intraub et al., 2008). Similar 
to the difference in overall attention allocated to a scene resulting in poorer scene memory 
(Intraub et al., 2008), increased levels of attention directed to an inconsistent central 
foreground object may result in poorer memory for the background, especially at the 
periphery where amodal information can be more readily accepted as perceptually derived. In 
other words, increased attention to an inconsistent object may pool attentional resources 
away from the background, reducing the amount of perceptual information that can be used 
to “defend” against the memory error of boundary extension. 
Present Experiments 
The present experiments were intended to address explicitly the possibility of 
semantic inconsistency effects upon boundary extension. More specifically, I explored 
whether semantic consistency affects boundary extension at short time intervals when scenes 
are viewed briefly, and if semantic consistency affects boundary extension at long time 
intervals when scenes are viewed for extended periods of time. To address each question in 
turn, two experiments were conducted. To explore the effect of semantic consistency on 
boundary extension at short time intervals, a paradigm was developed that for each trial, a 
single close-up image was presented for 250 ms, masked for 250 ms, and then was followed 
by an identical test image with a view-rating task (which will be described in the Method 
section). To explore the effect of semantic consistency on boundary extension at longer time 
intervals, a paradigm was developed using 10 close-up images that were presented for 15 s 
with 1-s masks interleaved. After the presentation of all 10 images, a description of the 
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memory test was given during the retention interval. The memory test involved the same 
rating-task as in the previous experiment, where identical close-up images were presented in 
the same sequence as they were initially presented; memory for each picture in the stimulus 
sequence was tested. Semantic consistency was manipulated by pairing consistent base 
images (e.g., football player in stadium and priest in church) and swapping objects to 
produce inconsistent images (e.g., football player in church and priest in stadium). The 
rationale for using a 250 ms stimulus and 250 ms mask in the brief duration experiment and 
using a 15 s stimulus and 1 s mask in the long-duration experiment was that these are 
standard durations used in boundary extension literature, and this allows us to make direct 
comparisons to those other studies; it is also standard that about 20 images be presented in 
brief-durations test of boundary extension and that 10 images be presented in long-duration 
test of boundary extension. The rationale for using color photographs with a single 
foreground object was that these types of images may be most sensitive to detecting effects 
of semantic consistency, as previous studies have suggested (Bonitz & Gordon, 2008; 
Davenport & Potter, 2004). I hypothesized that, for brief-duration pictures and not for longer-
duration pictures, semantically inconsistent scenes would yield larger amounts of boundary 
extension compared to semantically consistent scenes because more attention would be 
directed to the objects in conditions of semantic inconsistency. I hypothesized that there 
would be no significant difference between conditions for longer-duration pictures because 
attention would be more evenly spread across the image for 15 s scene presentations. A 
significant difference in either direction for long durations may allow this possibility to be 
ruled out.  
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Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants. Participants consisted of 60 undergraduate students (21 male, 39 
female) enrolled in introductory and intermediate-level Psychology courses at Appalachian 
State University who had volunteered to be a part of the department subject pool to fulfill a 
research requirement for their course. From this subject pool, participants were recruited 
using the SONA system, in which students selected from pre-designated time-slots.  IRB 
approval was acquired 10/18/2012 (see Appendix B), and all participants were treated in 
accordance with ethical guidelines (see Appendix C).   
Apparatus. Stimuli were presented using a Dell OPTIPLEX 755 computer and a Dell 
P-1130 21 in. CRT monitor. The refresh rate was set at 120 Hz, and images were shown at a 
resolution of 1024 × 768 pixels in 32 bit color. The program software was based on a 
template program provided by SR Research Inc., written in C, which was used to display the 
stimuli and record participants’ responses.  
Stimuli. Experimental stimuli consisted of 42 images containing a foreground object 
on a background that were either semantically consistent or inconsistent with the background 
(e.g., a football player in a football stadium vs. a football player in a church). Twenty of these 
images were borrowed with permission from Davenport and Potter (2004), and 20 others 
were composites of objects and backgrounds retrieved from the Internet that were 
conceptually modeled after other image pairs used in the aforementioned experiment (with 
one background borrowed from Torralba’s indoor scene database; the remaining two practice 
images were images used in previous boundary extension experiments). The experimental 
images were borrowed from and modeled after Davenport and Potter (2004) because a 
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semantic consistency effect has already been found for these images, and we wanted to see if 
an analogous semantic consistency effect would be found for the spatial expanse of views. 
Because of the conceptual equivalence between the stimuli, we did not deem it necessary to 
perform a norming study prior to the present experiments to provide evidence for our 
categorization of semantically consistent and inconsistent images.  
In the original versions of the borrowed images, the object size was different between 
consistent and inconsistent images (e.g., the priest was larger in the church than on the 
football field), and because how close-up an image is was operationalized as the size of the 
object relative to the size of the image view, images were cropped and resized so that objects 
were the same size in both semantically consistent and inconsistent scenes. After these 
modifications, image views subtended 11.1° × 8.3° of visual angle and were embedded 
within a black background which subtended 28.4° × 21.3° of visual angle. Of the 40 
experimental stimuli, 20 of the images were semantically consistent (base images) and the 
other 20 were semantically inconsistent (critical images). Semantic consistency was 
manipulated in the experimental stimuli by pairing consistent base images (e.g., a football 
player in a stadium and a priest in a church) and swapping objects to produce semantically 
inconsistent images (e.g., a football player in a church and a priest in a stadium). Two 
versions of image sequences were developed such that each participant saw either the 
consistent or inconsistent versions of image pairs and such that half of the images were 
inconsistent and the other half were consistent.   
Procedure. Participants were seated such that the viewing distance was 
approximately 80 cm. Before each trial, a fixation cross was presented at the center of the 
screen at which participants were asked to fixate before the stimulus appears. All 20 trails 
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(including two practice trials) were self-initiated by a participant pressing the space bar on a 
keyboard positioned in front of the monitor. On each trial, a single stimulus was presented 
for 250 ms followed immediately by a 250 ms visual noise mask, which filled the screen. The 
mask had a dynamically changing central portion that consisted of schematic faces that 
subtended 5.5° × 5.5° of visual angle. This sequence involved two different faces, with the 
first shown for 150 ms and the second shown for 100 ms. This type of mask was used to 
minimize implicit verbalization and to keep the participants’ fixation at the center of the 
image. After the mask, the exact same image reappeared at the same location on the screen, 
and participants were then prompted to complete a computer-generated rating scale task. In 
this task, each participant was asked to indicate whether the test view was “the same” view 
as, “closer up”, or “further away” than the stimulus view. These three verbal labels were 
presented below a horizontal bar at the bottom of the screen (below the test image) that had 
five equally-spaced intersecting vertical lines that corresponded to the three labels plus the 
points that bisected each side of the scale.  
Participants were instructed to move a vertical pointer along the horizontal bar that 
could be placed at any point along the horizontal line. The number of pixels between the 
center of the scale and where the pointer was placed by a given participant was then recorded 
and normalized to the 5-point scale that corresponds to the five response categories used in 
the more traditional version of the rating task (i.e., “much closer up” (-2), “somewhat closer 
up” (-1), “the same” (0), “somewhat farther away” (1), or “much farther away” (2), than the 
stimulus image). Perceiving the test stimulus as close-up (i.e., negative values) was indicative 
of boundary extension, whereas boundary restriction was indicated by rating the test stimulus 
as further away (i.e., positive values). This task was then followed by a confidence rating in 
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which the participant rated his or her response on the memory test as sure (3), pretty sure (2), 
not sure (1), or DRP (0 – “do not remember picture”), and in which, as in the memory test, 
only the verbal labels were presented to participants. This task was included to allow 
participants to indicate when the completion of the recognition task was based on no memory 
of the stimulus image and when it could be assumed that a guessing strategy was used. Trials 
on which participants report not remembering the test picture were excluded from all the 
analyses. At the end of the experiment, participants were debriefed.   
Results  
 Participants were overall generally confident in their responses (M = 2.06, SD = .36); 
there were no cases of participants indicating that they did not remember the picture in the 
confidence rating. To test the hypothesis that boundary extension was elicited by the images 
used in the experiment, we calculated the average view ratings for all participants collapsed 
across both conditions and compared this to a value of zero. A one-sample t-test revealed that 
there was significant boundary extension, t(58) = 5.09, p < .001, d = 1.34. This supports the 
hypothesis that the images used in this experiment elicited boundary extension. To test the 
hypothesis that there would be more boundary extension for inconsistent scenes compared to 
consistent scenes, we compared the average view ratings for the two conditions across all 
participants. A paired samples t-test revealed that there was no significant difference in 
boundary extension between semantically consistent scenes (M = -.17, SD = .28) and 
semantically inconsistent scenes (M = -.17, SD = .23), t < 1. These findings do not support 
the hypothesis that there would be more boundary extension for inconsistent scenes 
compared to consistent scenes.  
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Experiment 2 
Method 
Participants. Participants were 60 undergraduates (17 male, 43 female) recruited 
from the same subject pool as Experiment 1.  
Apparatus. The apparatus was the same as in Experiment 1.  
Stimuli. The stimuli were the same as in Experiment 1.  
Procedure. The viewing distance of participants was the same as in Experiment 1. As 
opposed to Experiment 1 in which each image was followed by a memory test, in Experiment 
2, I administered the memory test after all images had been presented. As in Experiment 1, a 
fixation cross was initially presented at the center of the screen where participants were asked 
to fixate before the image sequence began. Participants initiated the sequence of images by 
pressing the space bar. Images were each presented for 15 s followed by a 1 s visual noise 
mask that filled the screen. There was a 1-s inter-stimulus-interval with the fixation cross 
presented as a warning sign for the upcoming onset of the next stimulus. After all of the 
images had been viewed, the memory task was described to the participants during the 
retention interval. Participants were asked to complete the same rating scale, followed by a 
confidence judgment, as in Experiment 1, with the test images presented in the same 
sequence as presented during encoding. At the end of the experiment, participants were 
debriefed and thanked for their participation.  
Results  
 Participants were overall generally confident in their responses (M = 2.26, SD = .42); 
there were no cases of participants indicating that they did not remember the picture in the 
confidence rating. To test the hypothesis that boundary extension was elicited by the images 
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used in the experiment, we calculated the average view ratings for all participants collapsed 
across both conditions and compared this to a value of zero. A one-sample t-test revealed that 
there was significant boundary extension, t(59) = 5.77, p < .001, d = 1.50. This supports the 
hypothesis that the images used in this experiment elicited boundary extension. To test the 
hypothesis that there is more boundary extension for inconsistent scenes compared to 
consistent scenes, we compared the average view ratings for the two conditions across all 
participants. A paired samples t-test revealed that there was significantly more boundary 
extension for semantically consistent scenes (M = -.33, SD = .38) than for semantically 
inconsistent scenes (M = -.21, SD = .34), t(59) = -2.10, p < .05, d = .33. These findings may 
rule out the possibility that there is no difference in boundary extension between semantically 
consistent scenes and semantically inconsistent scenes for long durations.  
Discussion  
In two experiments, I tested whether object-background semantic consistency would 
influence boundary extension by presenting scenes with single foreground objects that were 
either semantically consistent or inconsistent with the background for brief- or long-duration 
image presentations. For brief-duration image presentations, I hypothesized that there would 
be more boundary extension for semantically inconsistent scenes because attention would 
initially be directed to the object (Bonitz & Gordon, 2008; Martens et al., 2011), resulting in 
poorer memory for the spatial expanse of the view (Intraub et al., 2008). For long-duration 
scene presentations, I hypothesized that there would be no difference in boundary extension 
because attention would be more evenly distributed across the image as time elapsed. Neither 
of these hypotheses was supported; here I observed no effect of semantic consistency for 
brief durations and instead observed an effect of semantic consistency for longer durations, 
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with semantically inconsistent scenes eliciting less boundary extension than semantically 
consistent scenes.  
Research suggests that contextual, semantically related information about a scene can 
be rapidly extracted (e.g., Davenport & Potter, 2004), well within the image duration used 
here, so why did we find no difference in boundary extension for semantically consistent and 
inconsistent object-background relationships at brief image durations and yet a significant 
difference at long image durations? One possibility is that boundary extension is context-
independent for brief image durations and is context-dependent for longer image durations. 
This interpretation is based on the speculation that rapidly activated, bottom-up influences of 
semantic consistency (as posited by early perceptual accounts; e.g., Biederman et al., 1982; 
Davenport & Potter, 2004; Friedman, 1979) are not involved in the computation of spatial 
expanse, whereas later, top-down influences of semantic consistency (as posited by post-
identification accounts; e.g., Henderson, 1992) are involved in the computation of spatial 
expanse. At earlier stages of processing, the computation of spatial expanse may use only 
object-background spatial relations, such as how much space an object fills (an idea that will 
be discussed in detail later) and may not use any semantic information about the scene. At 
later stages of processing, the computation of spatial expanse may involve not only object-
background spatial relations, but also top-down input regarding semantically inconsistent 
scenes that could activate two separate contexts (i.e., the context depicted in the scene and 
the context in which the inconsistent object normally appears), which together may interfere 
with a coherent spatial computation. This interpretation would explain why, in the present 
thesis, semantically inconsistent scenes elicited less boundary extension than semantically 
consistent scenes for long image-durations only.   
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Why would boundary extension only be influenced by post-identification input 
regarding the semantic consistency between objects and backgrounds? The post-
identification account (e.g., functional isolation model; Henderson, 1992) posits that 
semantic information is incorporated into perception only after both objects and their 
background have been identified. Therefore, this model predicts that there should be no 
influence of object-background semantic consistency early in perception. Besides the 
behavioral evidence for this model (e.g., Hollingworth & Henderson, 1998; Henderson, 
Weeks, and Hollingworth, 1999), the post-identification account of semantic consistency is 
supported by ERP research reporting a more positive N400 (an ERP component 
characterized by a negative voltage deflection emerging at approximately 400 ms post-
stimulus onset), which is held to reflect semantic violation processing that is post-
identification (see Bar, 2004; Ganis & Kutas, 2003; Mudrik, Lamy, & Deouell, 2010). This 
ERP component has also been associated with the parahippocampal cortex (PHC; see Bar, 
2004); the PHC is home to the PPA (see Epstein, 2005) which is thought to be involved in 
the processing of scenes (Epstein, 2005), and also shows patterns of activity suggestive of its 
involvement in the computation of spatial expanse (see Park, Brady, Greene, & Oliva, 2011; 
Park et al., 2007). Given that this later negative potential associated with post-identification 
semantic violation processing appears to occur in areas thought to be involved in boundary 
extension (i.e., PPA; Park et al., 2007), a post-identification account of semantic consistency 
may be appropriate for the computation of spatial expanse; it would follow that early 
perceptual influences of semantic consistency would not have an effect on boundary 
extension.  
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This interpretation would also be consistent with the multiplexer model of contextual 
facilitation (Bar, 2004). In this model, coarse global information about a scene is first rapidly 
projected to the PHC (Bar, 2004). The PHC uses this coarse information in turn to activate 
representations of candidate objects within the inferior temporal cortex (ITC) that belong to 
the activated context frame (e.g., office context frame activates object representations of 
computer, desk, and chair; Bar, 2004). Subsequently, high-frequency information arrives to 
the ITC providing detail about the scene’s objects and semantic context. The candidate object 
consistent with the detailed information is selected and recognition is completed; all other 
candidates are discarded; however, if the object identity projected by the high spatial 
frequencies is not one of the candidate objects activated by the PHC, then a N400 is elicited 
in the PHC, possibly to suggest an alternative context frame be activated (Bar, 2004). If 
spatial computation takes place in this area of the brain, this would lend support to why we 
did not find an effect of semantic consistency for brief image durations (i.e., this component 
takes place after the image display terminated). That is, spatial computation may operate on 
low-spatial frequency information initially and only after approximately 400 ms post-
stimulus onset will a semantic violation be signaled for alternative contexts to be considered 
within the spatial framework.  
What are the broader implications of these findings for the function of boundary 
extension? It has been suggested by Intraub, Hoffman, Wetherhold, and Stoehs (2006) that 
boundary extension can serve to integrate successive views based on their finding of more 
boundary extension on the cued side of an image compared to the non-cued side. Another 
function of boundary extension may be to predict spatial layout to facilitate interaction with 
objects, as suggested by the findings of Gottesman (2011), in which distance judgments of 
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objects were primed by partial views that did not contain the part of the view where the 
objects appeared. This claim is also supported by research providing evidence that boundary 
extension is not influenced by the absolute size of an object (i.e., whether it’s a close-up view 
of a small object or a wide-angle view of a large object) but is rather caused by how much 
space a given object fills (i.e., spatial relations between object and borders of the depicted 
area; see Bertamini, Jones, Spooner, & Hecht, 2005). The findings of Bertamini et al. (2005) 
suggest, more specifically, that the closer the distance between the object borders and the 
edges of the view, the more boundary extension is elicited (also see Dickinson & Intraub, 
2008; Intraub et al., 1992; Intraub et al., 2008; Intraub & Dickinson, 2008; Intraub & 
Richardson, 1989; Park et al., 2007). This further suggests that boundary extension may 
indeed be functioning to predict spatial layout around an object so that interaction with that 
object can be facilitated. If this were the case, then the context in which an object appears 
would not influence boundary extension because predicting spatial layout in service of 
interaction with a given object should not depend on the semantics of the scene in which a 
given object appeared. This implication is consistent with the findings reported here.  
Implications for the Multi-Source Model of Scene Perception (Intraub, 2010) 
The multi-source model of scene perception (Intraub, 2010) posits that scene 
perception is characterized by both visual and non-visual sources of information being 
incorporated into a unified framework. Boundary extension under this model is a source-
monitoring error (Johnson et al., 1993) in which non-visual information is falsely attributed 
as visually derived. From this, it is expected that the variables that influence boundary 
extension should be predicted by the source-monitoring framework (see Johnson et al., 
1993). For example, dividing attention at encoding, which should provide less detailed 
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perceptual detail and increase reality-monitoring source confusions, has been shown to 
increase boundary extension (Intraub et al., 2008). As stated in the Introduction, the rationale 
and hypotheses for this thesis were based on an attention-mediated effect, which made a clear 
prediction under the source-monitoring framework (Johnson et al., 1993); however, the 
source-monitoring framework (Johnson et al., 1993) does not make a clear prediction as to 
how the semantic consistency between objects and backgrounds alone should influence 
source-monitoring accuracy. This suggests that the source-monitoring framework that is 
incorporated within the multi-source model of scene perception could be elaborated by 
including more detail regarding the time course of scene perception and how that would 
influence source-monitoring performance based on variables such as semantic coherence of a 
scene.  
Alternative Explanations  
One alternative explanation of the present findings could be related to when the exact 
nature of the memory test was revealed. In contrast to Experiment 1, Experiment 2 deferred 
revealing the exact nature of the memory test until after the encoding procedure; that is, we 
told the participants that there would be a memory test, but we did not provide the details 
until all the images had been viewed. Therefore, it may be that participants anticipatively 
construed the memory task as being one in which they would be asked to indicate which 
objects and contexts co-occurred with one another. If participants did indeed construe the 
task in this manner, they would maximize performance by attending more to semantically 
inconsistent scenes whose objects would not be supported by their probabilistic context at 
recall. Assuming that this encoding strategy was adopted, the increased attention to 
semantically inconsistent scenes would explain why we observed less boundary extension for 
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these conditions in Experiment 2, as the presumably more detailed representations of 
semantically inconsistent scenes would reduce memory error for spatial expanse (cf., Intraub, 
et al. 2008). Unfortunately, there is no evidence to support or exclude this possibility.   
Another alternative would be related to where people fixated during Experiment 2; 
because we did not measure eye-movements in Experiment 2, we can only speculate, but it 
may be the case that participants made more fixations to the background and the edges of the 
view for semantically inconsistent scenes (which should reduce boundary extension; 
Gagnier, Dickinson, & Intraub, 2013). Although there is much semantic consistency research 
exploring eye movements in multi-object scenes (Bonitz & Gordon, 2008; de Graef et al., 
1990; Henderson et al., 1999; Loftus & Mackworth, 1978), there is little research exploring 
eye movements in scenes with a single foreground object. There is evidence arguing against 
this possibility, as much research demonstrates that it is the inconsistent objects themselves 
that are fixated, and not the inconsistent background in which they appear (e.g., Bonitz & 
Gordon, 2008). Moreover, the findings of Martens et al. (2011) suggest that more fixations 
should be made to objects in inconsistent scenes than to the backgrounds. Provided that it is 
not clear why participants would make more fixations to the background in semantically 
inconsistent scenes and that there is evidence to suggest the opposite (more attention to 
objects in semantically inconsistent scenes; Martens et al., 2011), I reject this alternative 
explanation as a plausible possibility. 
Limitations 
The first category of limitations in the present experiments is that there are 
differences across the two experiments that make isolating the exact cause of the results 
difficult. That is, there were many procedural and design aspects that were intentionally not 
SEMANTIC CONSISTENCY IN BOUNDARY EXTENSION 
 
41 
held constant between the two experiments and that could have individually or collectively 
caused the observed differences. For Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, respectively, the 
variables confounded with the independent variable of image duration (250 ms vs. 15 s) 
included memory load (1 item vs. 10 items), retention interval (250 ms vs. ≈5 min), whether 
participants had the chance to actively explore the scene or not (i.e., through eye 
movements), and when the memory test was revealed (before encoding vs. after encoding). 
The observed effects may have been a result of one or any combination of these variables, 
although some are more likely than others. The interpretation developed here is based on the 
image duration alone, as it was the manipulated variable; however, the variable of “memory 
description” may have caused all or possibly some of this effect as described in the previous 
section (also see previous section for rejecting the possibility that participants explored the 
image differently across the independent variable in Experiment 2). The variables of memory 
load and retention interval may have made access to scene representations in memory more 
difficult in Experiment 2; however, it is not clear why there would be better retrieval of 
inconsistent scenes relative to consistent scenes.  
The second category of limitations in the present experiments was the properties of 
the stimuli used in the present experiments. As mentioned in the Method section, we 
borrowed stimuli from Davenport and Potter (2004) because an effect of semantic 
consistency had already been detected for this set of stimuli; however, there were two 
primary issues with the stimuli that did not make them suitable for testing the possible effect 
of semantic consistency on boundary extension in their original state. Both of these issues 
stem from the way a scene’s spatial expanse has been operationalized in the literature and in 
the present thesis. That is, how close-up a scene is was operationalized in this thesis as how 
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much of the vertical dimension an object filled in the scene; the more of the vertical 
dimension an object occupied, the more close-up the scene was. The first issue with the 
stimuli with respect to our operationalization of spatial expanse was that objects on average 
did not fill up much of the vertical dimension; one of the most replicated findings in the 
boundary extension literature is that close-up views elicit more boundary extension compared 
to wide-angle views (e.g., Intraub, et al., 1992; Intraub & Richardson, 1989); therefore, 
making these images more close-up was desirable because it would provide us with a more 
sensitive measure of differences resulting from semantic consistency by maximizing the 
amount of boundary extension elicited by the stimuli. Second, some objects were not the 
same size when they appeared outside of their original context as they were when they 
appeared in their original context (e.g., the priest was smaller in the inconsistent football 
stadium scene compared to the consistent church scene); this was an issue because the size 
difference of a given object across semantically consistent and inconsistent images would 
have likely influenced boundary extension separately from our manipulation of semantic 
consistency.   
To address these issues, I used Adobe Photoshop to crop the images such that objects 
filled more of the vertical dimension so that the overall view was more close-up and such that 
objects were the same size in both of the two images that they appeared in. Unfortunately, 
controlling for object size through these modifications was at the expense of holding 
background spatial expanse constant; that is, semantically consistent and inconsistent scenes 
in image pairs sometimes contained different amounts of background spatial expanse (e.g., 
the consistent version of the football field background depicted more of the people in the 
bleachers and the top of a house behind the bleachers, whereas the inconsistent version of the 
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football field background depicted less of the people in the bleachers and did not contain the 
top of the house behind the bleachers). This concession may have introduced some error into 
our data which may have hidden any effect of semantic consistency on boundary extension 
that I was looking for. More specifically, 18 of the total 40 experimental stimuli had 
differential amounts of background expanse across semantically consistent and inconsistent 
objects; of these 18 images, 16 had more spatial expanse for consistent objects. Given that 
40% of the image pairs used here had more spatial expanse depicted for semantically 
consistent scenes, this may have significantly reduced the amount of boundary extension for 
semantically consistent scenes (less boundary extension for more spatial expanse depicted; 
see Gagnier, Intraub, Oliva, & Wolfe, 2011). If this were the case, we would be erroneously 
concluding that there was no effect in Experiment 1, when in fact there may have been.  For 
some of the images, the difference in spatial expanse was so extreme after the cropping that 
we abandoned half of the original stimuli and created conceptually identical versions using 
images from the Internet. These images had both object size and spatial expanse held 
constant across both semantically consistent and inconsistent versions; however, this also 
introduced further heterogeneity into our stimuli that may have affected the results in 
unknown ways. Finally, the objects in image pairs did not fill the same amount of area (e.g., 
an ambulance filled a more space in a scene than did a camel), which may also have affected 
boundary extension independently of our manipulation of semantic consistency.  
Suggestions for Future Research 
Future research exploring the role of semantic consistency in boundary extension 
should control for some of the procedural and stimulus confounds in the present thesis. 
Regarding the procedural confounds, experiments that hold all variables constant except for 
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only one can more confidently isolate what variable, or variables, may be causing the effect 
of semantic consistency on boundary extension observed in the present thesis. Regarding the 
stimulus confounds, researchers conducting future research should also create a more 
homogeneous set of stimuli to test how semantic consistency effects boundary extension. 
More specifically, this would involve controlling for equivalent amounts of background 
spatial expanse across semantically consistent and inconsistent scenes, controlling for object 
area by using roughly equally sized and shaped objects across image pairs used for the 
semantic consistency manipulation (e.g., a football and a roasted chicken), and creating all 
scenes using images from the Internet, by cropping all objects and pasting them on other 
backgrounds, consistent or inconsistent, so that all images contain an object on a different 
background from which it was photographed (or alternatively using all natural images to 
avoid the “pasting effect”; Joubert, Fize, Rousselet, & Fabre-Thorpe, 2008). Finally, future 
research should record eye movements to observe if there are any differences in where 
people are looking between semantically consistent and inconsistent scenes for long image 
durations. If future research controls for these procedural and stimulus confounds in addition 
to measuring eye fixations, we can develop a clearer picture of how semantic consistency 
influences boundary extension.  
Conclusions 
 Here I have documented the first systematic exploration of the effect of semantic 
consistency on boundary extension. As a first attempt, the findings reported here are highly 
suggestive of a memory-based, post-identification influence of semantic consistency on the 
computation of spatial expanse. This speculative interpretation should be considered with 
caution, however, as the results were unexpected and have yet to be replicated. Future 
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research on this topic will provide insight regarding how and when spatial computation is 
influenced by semantic information.  
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Appendix A 
 
Table 1 
 
Listing of Stimulus Names 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Consistent Version     Inconsistent Version 
_________________________________ ________________________________ 
 
Intersection – Ambulance   Intersection – Camel 
Desert – Camel    Desert – Ambulance  
Forest – Deer     Forest – Trumpeter  
Parade – Trumpeter    Parade – Deer  
Stage – Ballerina    Stage – Cyclist 
Road – Cyclist    Road – Ballerina  
Football Field – Football Player  Football Field - Priest 
Church – Priest    Church – Football Player 
Beach – Sand Castle    Beach – Pig  
Mud – Pig      Mud – Sand Castle 
Race Track – Race Car   Race Track – Tractor  
Farm – Tractor    Farm – Race Car 
Bowling Alley – Bowler   Bowling Alley – Buffalo  
Range – Buffalo    Range – Bowler  
Ice Rink – Figure Skater   Ice Rink – Race Horse  
Horse Track – Race Horse   Horse Track – Figure Skater 
Earth – Space Shuttle    Earth – Sea Turtle 
Underwater – Sea Turtle   Underwater – Space Shuttle 
Mountain Valley – Woman on Donkey Mountain Valley – Man on Motorcycle 
Parking Lot – Man on Motorcycle   Parking Lot – Woman on Donkey 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Images in pairs follow each other in the rows.  
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Appendix B 
To: Daniel Lacombe  
 
CAMPUS MAIL  
 
From: Dr. Stan Aeschleman, Institutional Review Board Chairperson 
Date: 10/18/2012  
RE: Notice of IRB Approval by Expedited Review (under 45 CFR 46.110)  
Study #: 13-0086  
 
Study Title: Semantic consistency in scene perception  
Submission Type: Initial  
Expedited Category: (7) Research on Group Characteristics or Behavior, or Surveys, 
Interviews, etc.  
Approval Date: 10/18/2012  
Expiration Date of Approval: 10/17/2013  
 
This submission has been approved by the Institutional Review Board for the period 
indicated. It has been determined that the risk involved in this research is no more than 
minimal.  
 
 
 
 
Investigator’s Responsibilities:  
 
Federal regulations require that all research be reviewed at least annually. It is the Principal 
Investigator’s responsibility to request renewal of approval before the expiration date. You 
may not continue any research activity beyond the expiration date without IRB approval.  
 
Any adverse event or unanticipated problem involving risks to subjects must be reported 
immediately to the IRB. You are required to obtain IRB approval for changes to any aspect 
of this study before they can be implemented except to eliminate apparent immediate 
hazards. Best wishes with your research!  
 
CC: 
Christopher Dickinson, Psychology  
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Appendix C 
Consent to Participate in Research 
Information to Consider About this Research 
 
Semantic Consistency in Scene Perception  
 
Principal Investigator: Daniel LaCombe Jr.  
Department: Psychology 
Contact Information: 311 Smith-Wright Hall, lacombed@appstate.edu  
Faculty advisor: Dr. Chris Dickinson 
Contact Information: 203 Smith-Wright Hall, 828 263-4010, dickinsonca@appstate.edu 
 
What is the purpose of this research? 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study about the nature of information that is 
retained when we view pictures that depict scenes in the real world.  By doing this study we 
hope to learn about what information people remember when viewing pictures of natural 
scenes. 
 
Why am I being invited to take part in this research?  
 
You are being invited to participate because you are a healthy volunteer with no history of 
vision or attention deficits. If you volunteer to take part in this study, you will be one of 
about 240 people to do so. 
 
Are there reasons I should not take part in this research? 
 
If you have any uncorrected vision problems, problems with color vision, or attention deficits 
that might affect performance in this experiment, you will inform the experimenter that you 
may not be eligible to participate.  You are not required to disclose the actual reason, 
however. 
 
What will I be asked to do? 
 
The research procedures will be conducted at 216 Smith-Wright Hall. You will need to come 
here one time for approximately 30 minutes during the study.  You will be asked to view a 
series of single photographs of natural scenes, with each picture followed by a mask and a 
brief memory test for that picture.   
 
What are possible harms or discomforts that I might experience during the research? 
 
To the best of our knowledge, the risk of harm for participating in this research study is no 
more than you would experience in everyday life.   
 
What are possible benefits of this research? 
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There may be no personal benefit from your participation but the information gained by 
doing this research may help others in the future.   
 
This study should help us learn about what information about scenes is remembered across 
eye movements.  In addition, your participation may contribute to overall knowledge about 
how people study and remember scenes. 
 
Will I be paid for taking part in the research? 
 
We will not pay you for the time you volunteer while being in this study.  You will receive 1 
Experiential Learning Credit (ELC) toward your General Psychology research participation 
requirement for today’s experiment (if you are participating for credit in another class, you 
will receive 1 ELC for that class).  The requirements and options for research participation 
have been outlined in the syllabus for your psychology class. 
 
How will you keep my private information confidential? 
 
Your information will be combined with information from other people taking part in the 
study. When we write up the study to share it with other researchers, we will write about the 
combined information. You will not be identified in any published or presented materials.  
This study is anonymous.  That means that no one, not even members of the research team, 
will know that the information you gave came from you.  No identifying information will be 
part of the data file from today's experiment, and the list that identifies you as a participant in 
this experiment will be kept in a password-protected database to help maintain your 
confidentiality.  Once the information in our database that identifies you is no longer needed, 
the list containing that information will be destroyed. 
 
Whom can I contact if I have a question? 
 
The people conducting this study will be available to answer any questions concerning this 
research, now or in the future. You may contact the Principal Investigator at 
lacombed@appstate.edu.  If you have questions about your rights as someone taking part in 
research, contact the Appalachian Institutional Review Board Administrator at 828-262-2130 
(days), through email at irb@appstate.edu or at Appalachian State University, Office of 
Research and Sponsored Programs, IRB Administrator, Boone, NC 28608. 
 
Do I have to participate?  What else should I know? 
 
Your participation in this research is completely voluntary.  If you choose not to volunteer, 
there will be no penalty and you will not lose any benefits or rights you would normally 
have.  If you decide to take part in the study you still have the right to decide at any time that 
you no longer want to participate. There will be no penalty and no loss of benefits or rights if 
you decide at any time to stop participating in the study.  This research project has been 
approved, as required, by the Institutional Review Board of Appalachian State University.  
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This study was approved on 10/1812.  This approval will expire on 10/17/13 unless the IRB 
renews the approval of this research. 
 
I have decided I want to take part in this research.  What should I do now? 
 
By proceeding with the activities described above, you acknowledge that you have read and 
agreed to the descriptions and terms outlined in this consent form, and voluntarily agree to 
participate in this research. 
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Vita 
 Daniel Charles LaCombe Jr. was born in Newark, Delaware, to Andea and Dan 
LaCombe. He graduated from the University of Delaware in 2011 with a Bachelor of Arts 
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where he was awarded a Master of Arts degree in General Experimental Psychology.  
 
